Introduction
For the better part of two decades economists have debated the merits of regulations that would require a minimum level of subordinated debt in a bank's capital structure. Proponents view a subordinated debt requirement as a reform that can resolve agency problems created or exacerbated by federal safety net guarantees. Typically, proposals for a sub-debt requirement cite increased market discipline and reduced taxpayer exposure to loss as the primary bene ts. Moreover, proposals such a s W all (1989) and Calomiris (1997) attempt to resolve r e gulator principal-agency problems through features in their proposed sub-debt structures that force earlier o cial recognition of a institution's insolvency. Policymakers, too, have begun to seriously consider subordinated debt proposals. Both the U.S. and European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committees have their own proposals, and the Federal Reserve System convened a Study Group on Subordinated Notes and Debentures (1999) . A joint report by the Fed and Treasury mandated by the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) concluded that \existing evidence supports e orts to use subordinated debt as a way to encourage market discipline" and also held out the possibility that, pending further research, \the Secretary or the Board may recommend such a policy to Congress." (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserch System and the Secretary of the U.S. Department o f t h e T reasury (2000)). Furthermore, section 121 of the GLB Act in fact requires that large holding companies controlling a nancial subsidiary must have at least one issue of rated debt outstanding (albeit not necessarily subordinated).
Proponents of subordinated debt have suggested that it will increase market discipline in two ways. First, the interest rates on debt issues will provide information to supervisors, in some proposals triggering prompt corrective action, in others merely providing supplemental information. This is referred to as indirect market discipline, as it relies on the proper response by the supervisors. Second, subordinated debt provides direct market discipline, as banks taking riskier strategies face higher debt prices, and thus nd funding more di cult. They also face direct pressure from existing bond holders.
The literature on subordinated debt has addressed these issues separately. Theoretical studies by Winton (1995) , Hart and Moore (1995) , Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) , and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) have explored the direct incentive e ects, while empirical studies by Avery, Belton, and Goldberg (1988) , Flannery and Sorescu (1996) , and Evano and Wall (2001) have looked at how bank risk a ects subordinated debt yields. Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) study how market and supervisory assessments of risks di er, while Maclachlan (2001) and others have questioned the ability o f regulators to credibly apply indirect discipline. Levonian (2001) assesses the relative merits of subordinated debt against other types of stricter capital requirements. Thomson and Osterberg (1991) show h o w e v en in the absence of information and incentive e ects, subordinated debt reduces taxpayer exposure to loss.
There has beenvirtually no work, however, on striking the proper balance between direct and indirect market discipline, nor on the possible trade-o s between the two, despite the very di erent weights placed on the two in di erent proposals. Short-term debt would require the bank to constantly re-enter the market and prove i t s w orth, but it is unclear as to whether the debt would be as sensitive t o c r e d i t c hanges as longer-term debt. Making the debt putable would remove discretion from regulators, but might i n terfere with the spread's signaling properties. At this point w e h a ve n o w ay t o q u a n titatively assess these trade-o s, or consequently to assess the 1 di erent proposals.
Of course, properly assessing the signal-to-noise properties will illuminate not only the tradeo s between di erent designs, but also the pitfalls of inferring risk given any particular proposal. Thus, to what extent does the standard approach of looking at the spread between the yield on sub debt and comparable Treasury bonds go wrong by ignoring maturity? Would regulators incorrectly view one bank as riskier merely because it had longer-term bonds? The problem exists not just across banks but across time as well. To what extent would changes in the riskfree term structure show u p a s c hanges in the credit spread? If we had extensive experience with a r i c h m a r k et of subordinated debt and associated derivatives, we might a n s w er these questions with further empirical work. When it becomes a question of security design, however, we need another route to assess the quantitative e ects involved.
In this paper we evaluate the information content of subordinated debt under various proposals, using recent advances in asset pricing theory. Because we have a model, we can hold xed the underlying risk of the bank and examine how the price (or yield) of subordinated debt varies with maturity, with the underlying risk-free term structure, and with the addition of embedded options such as puts. This approach stops short of a full evaluation, as it does not quantitatively assess the incentive e ects. For example, while we quantify the information lost by adding putabiliy, w e cannot quantify the bene t from reducing forebearance. We nd:
Credit spreads vary by maturity. In spite of this observation, in ranking banks by their risk, the maturity of the subordinated debt does not matter much. Subordinated debt of very short maturity (under two years) is sensitive t o credit shocks, but the impact of credit shocks among longer-maturity bonds is less apparent. If two banks have the same short-term credit spread, their inherent risk may be quite di erent, since other factors of the spread process, such as their mean reversion factors, could be substantially di erent. We identify several examples of this. Theoretically, many factors besides bank risk can a ect credit spreads, and identifying a simple mapping from spreads to risk is nontrivial. We nd, however, that many o f these extraneous e ects are not quantitatively signi cant. For example, changes in the shape of the risk-free term structure, or in interest rate volatilities do not have a major impact on credit spreads. When a put is added to a xed-rate bond,the e ects of maturity and volatility become signi cant. Changes in the put premium dominate the credit spread, so that observed spreads re ect interest rate movements rather than bank risk. Adding a put to oating-rate bonds, however, removes most of the e ect of the risk free term structure. Credit spreads once again primarily re ect bank risk. From these ndings we conclude that xed-rate putable debt should not be adopted. Although any conclusions for standard xed-rate debt or putable oating-rate debt are more dependent on the range of our data and our model speci cation, our evidence strongly suggests that little, if any, information is lost by adding a put to oating rate debt. Furthermore, the credit spreads on xed and oating putable debt re ect primarily credit risk, not changes in the underlying risk free interest rate.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 brie y describes the di erent subordinated debt proposals. Section 3 presents a two-factor model for pricing riskless bonds and a three-factor model for pricing subordinated debt and related derivatives. Section 4 describes the estimation procedures, and using swap and swaption data, calibrates the two-factor model for riskless bonds. In addition, we use subordinated bond data to estimate the term structure of credit spreads for ve large banks. The resulting estimates for these models are used as benchmark parameters in the evaluation of the proposals. Section 5 explores the alternative proposals and section 6 compares them.
The Di erent Proposals
A variety of subordinated debt plans have been proposed over the years (see the Study Group on Subordinated Notes and Debentures (1999) for a summary of many of them), and new plans are proposed regularly. It would be impractical to examine all of the proposals, and indeed the di erences between them often do not directly matter for the pricing questions we take up in this paper. Whether the amount of sub debt issued is tied to total assets or deposits, how m uch counts as regulatory capital, or whether banks or bank holding companies issue the debt, won't directly a ect the relationships we explore. Such di erences can have an important indirect e ect by c hanging the risk of the bank, and thus of the sub debt, but this will be subsumed in the risk factor.
We concentrate on four di erent proposals which b e t ween them span most of the sub debt plans. First, we look at the standard, noncallable, xed-rate debt with semiannual coupons. Because a key question is the impact of maturity on prices, we look at debt maturities of one through nine years. Secondly, we look at oating rate debt of the same maturities. The debt would be oating, paying the 3-month LIBOR rate semi-annually.
Next, as in Evano (1993) , we add a put feature to the xed-rate debt. Lastly, w e consider oating-rate debt putable at par. Since a put on xed-coupon debt will sometimes be exercised solely because of shifts in the term structure, Wall (1989) argues that putable oating-rate debt may g i v e a cleaner signal of credit events.
These di erent assets will be priced based on model parameters calculated for ve di erent banks which had enough outstanding issues of subordinated debt to allow calibration: Chase, JP Morgan, Wachovia, Bank One, and Bankers Trust. 1
Pricing Credit Derivatives
The methods we use for pricing the proposed subordinated debt instruments consist of three parts. First, for modeling the underlying risk-free term structure, we use a standard two-factor Heath Jarrow Morton model, which matches the initial term structure and allows the future dynamics of the term structure to evolve with di erent l e v els, slopes, and curvatures. Second, to model risky debt, we use a \reduced form" approach, where defaults occur at surprise stopping times. 2 In this framework, the default process of risky debt is modeled directly 1 For a discussion and some evidence on the question of whether the bank or the bank holding company should issue the sub debt, see Jagtiani, Kaufman, and Lemieux (2001) . This contrasts with more fundamental models based on Merton (1974) where default is endogenized, but rather than through the asset process for the rm, and assumptions are made regarding the recovery rate in default. Combining the default process and recovery rate with assumptions on the riskless term structure process leads to models for risky debt and their derivative products.
Third, the methodology used to price the options embedded in some proposals requires pricing American options present in putable debt. Since we h a ve a three-factor model, we resort to simulation methods of Longsta and Schwartz (2001) to price the embedded options.
The model that we use for pricing credit sensitive claims incorporates signi cant information on the term structure of interest rates, where much information is available, and is less demanding on the term structure of credit for an individual bank. In particular, the riskless term structure can readily be observed, and volatility information, which i s embedded in the prices of a wide array of liquid derivative p r i c e s s u c h a s c a p s , oors, and swaptions, can easily be extracted. In contrast the credit information for a particular bank typically comes in the form of a few prices of traded bonds and default swap quotations. Given this sparse information, the model for the spread is less demanding.
Speci cally, for the term structure of interest rates we adopt a two-factor Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (1992) model where forward rates are initialized to the observed values, and volatilities are humped functions of their maturities, consistent with empirical evidence (Amin and Morton (1994) ). In contrast, credit spreads are not initialized to given values. Rather, they are generated by an additional factor. The dynamics of the short credit spread are speci ed as a mean reverting process, correlated with interest rates. Given the dynamics of the riskless term structure and the short credit spread, a three-factor model for the risky forward rate is developed. Using market prices of risky debt, the parameters of the short credit spread can then becalibrated so that the model produces prices of risky debt that are close to market prices. The resulting model we obtain for the term structure of credit spreads is exible enough to permit upward, downward, and humped shapes.
Pricing Riskless Bonds
Partition the time interval into increments of width t years and label the time periods by consecutive i n tegers. Let f(t T) be the forward rate at period t, for the time period T T+ 1 ] . Hence, expressed in years, the actual time is T t (T + 1) t]. The forward rates, under the risk neutral equivalent martingale measure, are updated as follows:
where fZ (n) j n = 1 2g are independent standard normal random variables and the volatility structures are given by:
which h a ve been less successful at pricing risky debt. For examples of this approach see Kim, Ramaswamy, a n d Sundaresan (1993), Longsta and Schwartz (1995) , and Nielsen, Sao-Requejo, and Santa-Clara (1993) . Structural models are attractive on theoretical grounds, as they link the valuation of nancial claims to economic fundamentals. They have p r o ved to be hard to implement, however, because of the di culty i n v aluing the rm's assets, characterizing and measuring the rm's volatility, and because of the complexity of the capital structure of the rm. Moreover, as shown by Eom, Helwege, and zhi Huang (2000) , these models tend to generate spreads that are too low for high-quality borrowers.
where a j = e ; j t for j = 1 2:
These volatility structures imply that the volatility function for forward rates can be a humped function of the maturity, which is consistent with empirical evidence. The drift terms in equation (1) are completely determined by the volatility structures and are given by the discrete version of the Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (1992) restriction, which i s : f n (t T) = t (2) and (3), and the initial forward r ate curve ff (0 T )jT = 0 1 2 g , g i v e n , then the dynamics of the term structure can be r epresented by a process Markovian in two state variables, r(t) and u(t). In addition, u(0) = 0 and the two random variables, t and t , are standard normal random variables with correlation 1 = b 2 a 1 +c 2 a 2 d 1 .
(ii) The price a t t i m e t of a riskfree zero c oupon bond that pays $1 a t t i m e t + n, P(t t + n), i s : P(t t + n) = e ;An(t);Bnr(t) t;Cnu(t) t (7) where A 1 (t) = 0 , B 1 = 1 , C 1 = 0 , and B n = 1 + B n;1 a 1 C n = c 1 B n;1 + a 2 C n;1 A n (t) = A n;1 (t + 1 ) + B n;1 f(0 t + 1 ) + b(t + 1 ) ; a 1 f(0 t ) ; a 1 (f(0 t ) + b(t + 1)] t ; 1 2 (B n;1 d 1 + C n;1 1 a 2 ) 
Pricing Risky Bonds
Du e and Singleton (1999) price risky bonds under the assumption that if a default occurs, recovery is proportional to the predefault market value of the debt. Under this assumption they show that the price of a defaultable bond can be obtained as the martingale expectation of the promised face value and coupons, where all payo s are discounted by a speci c discount rate that embodies the riskless time value, the loss arrival rates, and the fractional recovery.
Speci cally, assume the time to default is generated by a C o x process. 3 The intensity o f t h e process, under the risk neutral measure Q, i s (t). Hence, the chance of default over some small time interval, t is 1 ; e ; (t) t ' (t) t. Let be the random variable representing the period in which default takes place. If default occurs, the rm recovers a fraction, (t), of the value that the bond would have had, if there had beenno default. Let G(t T) represent the period t value of a risky bondthat promises to pay $1 at period T. Then the date t price of a risky bond that matures in n periods, assuming the bond has not defaulted, is:
;r(t) t (1 ; (t) t) + (t) t (t)]E Q t G(t + 1 t + n)j > t + 1 ] Notice that (1 ; (t) t) + (t) t (t)] ' e ; (t) t(1; (t)) : Denote s(t) = (t)(1 ; (t)) , then the risky bond can be written as:
Indeed, Du e and Singleton's valuation formula for risky bonds is identical to the formula for risk-free bonds, with the exception that the riskless rate, r(t), is replaced by a n adjusted short rate given by R(t) = r(t) + s(t), where the spread, s(t), re ects the local default rate and the fractional loss rate given a default. The advantage of this approach is that once the higher rate is used as a discount rate, valuation can proceed as if the claim never defaults. This result makes it possible to transfer all the standard term structure models for default-free bondsto risky bonds, merely by parameterizing R(t) instead of r(t).
Using the reduced form modeling approach with fractional recovery implies that to price a risky bond,we need to specify the process for interest rates and for the short credit spread, under the risk neutral measure. In our approach, the interest rate process, under the risk neutral measure, is given by our two-factor discrete time model, given in equations (5) and (6), where the initial yield curve is given, and the volatility structure for forward rates is humped. The dynamics of the short credit spread process that we adopt is given by:
where t is a standard normal variable with C o r ( t t ) = 2 and C o r ( t t ) = 3 . The full model for establishing risky forward rates is then:
(10) In this representation, the short credit spread is mean reverting, persistent, and if the constraints 0 0, 1 0, and 2 0 are imposed, then the spread does not becomenegative. It may bethought of as an autoregressive process with noncentral 2 shocks. In addition, the short spread can have arbitrary correlation with the two state variables characterizing interest rates. The correlation between the short spread and interest rate , rs , s a y, i s g i v en by:
Hence, 3 in uences the correlation between interest rates and spreads. Further, 3 controls the skewness of the short spread if its value is positive, then negative i n n o vations on t+1 have l a r g e r in uences on the short spread than equivalent positive innovations. In this sense, 3 controls the skewness of the spread distribution.
Proposition 2 If the interest rate and the instantaneous credit spread, under the risk neutral measure, are given by (8), (9) and (10), then, risky zero coupon bond prices at date t can be expressed as:
G(t t + n) = P(t t + n)e ;Dns(t) t;En (11) where D n = 1 + D n;1 1 D 1 = 1 E n = E n;1 + D n;1 ( 0 + 2 3 3 ) t + 1 2 ln(1 + 2D n;1 2 t) ; (B n;1 d 1 p t 2 + C n;1 d 2 p t 3 ; 2D n;1 2 3 ) 2 ( t) 2 2(1 + 2D n;1 2 t) 2 ) E 1 = 0 B n = 1 + a 1 B n;1 B 1 = 1 C n = c 1 B n;1 + a 2 C n;1 C 1 = 0 :
Proof : See appendix. Knowing the zero coupon bond prices, we can obtain the term structure of credit spreads, which at date t is de ned as the di erence between the yields of defaultable and default-free bonds, and is given by the expression:
It is clear from the above formula that while the credit spread, s(t t + n), is not explicitly dependent on the level of interest rates, it is in uenced by the correlation e ects with the interest rate process. While the level and shape of the term structure of credit spreads is in uenced by a l l the parameters, the way i n w h i c h s h o c ks to the short credit spread, s(t), are transmitted along the term structure of credit spreads, is solely determined by the maturity and the parameter 1 . By taking particular di usion limits of the riskless dynamics, our model can be made to converge to continuous time di usions that include the two-factor Hull and White (1993) model. Similarly, b y taking di usion limits of the credit spread process, particular di usion limits can be obtained. 4 For our purposes, however, the discrete time models will su ce.
A special case of the above model occurs when the innovation for the credit event is taken to be the same innovation that a ects interest rates. Now the credit spread follows the dynamics:
Equation (12) is a special case of equation (10) where 2 = 1 and 3 = 1 . Risky discount bond prices for this model di er from the more general model in that the correlation between interest rates and spread innovations are controlled through 3 , and the correlation between the innovations of the long-run average of the short rate process and the spread innovation is not required. The correlation between interest rates and credit spreads is controlled by the level of 3 . That is, rs = ; 2 3 q 2 + 4 2 3 :
When 3 is positive(negative), the correlation is negative (positive).
Notice that if we were to consider two di erent rms, this model does not imply that the credit spreads are perfectly correlated. To see this, denote the credit spread of a second rm by:
The correlation between s(t) ands(t) is: . The correlation is 1 only when 3 equals~ 3 .
Our three-factor model for pricing risky debt has the following properties: credit spreads are nonnegative and arbitrarily correlated with interest rates, they exhibit skewness, and analytical solutions are avaiable for all maturities. 
Pricing American Options
Since some of the subordinated debt proposals involve the issuance of derivative c o n tracts, such as putable bonds, we need pricing mechanisms for such contracts. Longsta and Schwartz (2001) provide a simple method for valuing American options using simulation, and we use their methods. The key to their approach is to use least squares to estimate the conditional expected payo to the optionholder from continuation. Since the expectation can be represented as a linear function of the elements of basis functions, it can be approximated using the rst M basis functions. Once the basis functions have been speci ed, they show h o w regression methods can be used to accurately approximate the conditional expectation. Interestingly, Longsta and Schwartz show that many applications require only a few basis functions, and that the exact choice of basis functions is not that material. 5 In our application, we have three state variables, from which the entire term structures of riskless and risky debt can be reconstructed. We used functions of these state variables as independent variables for the regressions. For the case of put options on coupon bonds, we computed the price of the underlying risky and riskless bond and added them to the list of state variables. Simple polynomial functions of these state variables were used for the regressions. After some experimentation we ended up using the following variables, fr r 2 r 3 s s 2 s 3 u u 2 u 3 g.
The addition of other variables, including cross products of the state variables, did not provide additional accuracy.
Estimating the Parameters for the Credit Spread Model
Next we obtain parameter values by calibrating the model to the available data. We do this in two steps, rst obtaining the term structure parameters, and then obtaining the credit spread parameters. One result of this exercise is a realization that we must beprecise about several things often treated rather cavalierly. Chief among these is the de nition of the credit spread. To obtain a consistently de ned spread across several types of contracts, we restrict ourselves to the par spread: the di erence between par yields, calculated as the coupon payment that makes the value of a newly issued bond equal to par.
Calibrating the Interest Rate Parameters
To implement the model described above, we rst estimate the parameters of the two-factor interest rate process using term structure data.
For constructing the yield curve, we use futures and swap data on LIBOR. This means our work is not exactly comparable with work that uses the spread over U.S. Treasury yields. The LIBOR market gives us a richer and deeper set of traded derivatives that make estimating the volatility structure easier. Swap rates also have some claim to being a reasonable benchmark, as the market is active and quotes are readily available. 6 For the short end of the curve (up to one-year maturity), we use the ve nearest futures contracts on any given date. These futures 5 For example, using Hermite, Legendre,and Chebyshev polynomials or even simple powers of the state variable lead to accurate results.
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For more on pricing swaps and their relation to Treasuries, see Grinblatt (2001) , Collin-Dufresne and Solnik (2001) , and Du e and Singleton (1997). For a discussion of the extent to which s w aps have already replaced Treasuries as a benchmark, see Mengle and Smithson (2001) rates are interpolated, and then convexity corrected to obtain the forward rates for three, six, nine, and twelve-month maturities. The rest of the yield curve out to ve years is estimated using the forward rates bootstrapped at six month interva l s f r o m m a r k et swap rates. The futures and swap data are obtained from DataStream.
The data for this study consists of USD swaption prices. Speci cally, from Datastream, the swaptions data set comprises volatilities of swaptions of maturities six months, one, two, three, four, and ve y ears, with the underlying swap maturities of one, two, three, four, and ve years each (in all, there are 30 swaption contracts). As permarket convention, a swaption is considered at-the-money when the strike rate equals the swap rate for an equal maturity s w ap.
Like Amin and Morton (1994) , Driessen, Klaassen, and Melenberg (2000) , Longsta , SantaClara, and Schwartz (2001), and Moraleda and Pelsser (2000) , we estimate model parameters from cross sectional options data. This means that at any date we t models to the prices of swaptions for di erent maturities and underlying swap expirations. Our objective function is to minimize the sum of squared percentage errors between theoretical and actual prices using a nonlinear least squares procedure.
Using data on September 30, 1999, the following estimates were obtained for our two factor volatility structure: 
Calibrating the Credit Spread Parameters
To estimate the remaining parameters of the model requires credit spread information. To obtain an indication of the parameter values, we estimated the credit spread of ve di erent banks. The data were taken from Bloomberg. 7 The terms and prices of these issues on September30 1999, are shown in Table 2 along with the percentage errors of the tted prices, which were obtained by minimizing the sum of squared percentage errors. Table 2 Here
The values for the credit spread parameters are reported in Table 3 . Table 3 Here These estimated values are used as parameters for an illustrative case, for which w e can then price a variety o f h ypothetical debt contracts being considered under various proposals.
Notice that our model ts the data very well. On a par bond (price of $100) the mean absolute error from the model is $0.8. This compares with an average bid{ask spread of high{ grade corporate bonds of about $0.2 obtained by Chakravarty and Sarkar (1999) . Table 2 also shows the actual and tted yields-to-maturity for all the bonds. As can be seen from the table, the di erences are relatively small. The errors are symmetric, and the mean absolute percentage di erence in prices is 0.87% or 87 cents on a $100.00 bond (median, 0.62%). For yields, the mean absolute di erence is 2 basis points. On a perbank basis, the root mean squared error is 60.66. This compares, for example, with Du ee's per rm value of 7.99.
Evaluating the Proposals
In this section we use the calibrated model to generate theoretical prices of a variety o f s u b o rdinated debt contracts that have been proposed. How prices and yields change with bank risk and nonrisk factors depends on contract design. A good proposal has yields that are sensitive to risk factors and insensitive to nonrisk factors.
Spreads for Straight Subordinated Debt
The rst proposal we consider is xed-coupon subordinated debt. As an initial base case, gure 2 shows the credit spread curves for zero-coupon risky bonds of increasing maturities for our ve banks. Figure 2 Here The credit spreads are both signi cant and di er noticeably across banks: the di erence between Wachovia and Bankers Trust is over 50 basis points. Although the credit ratings of the banks in this sample show l i t t l e v ariation (all are Moody's A1 or A2), it is nice to note that the bank with the highest spread is rated A2 and that with the lowest is rated A1. The amount o f information in these rating di erences is unclear in fact, while Moody's rates Bank One above J.P. Morgan (A1 vs. A2), Standard and Poor's ranks Morgan several steps higher (AA-vs. A).
The spread curve also decreases with maturity for all but one bank, but only slightly. Even in that case however, the ve basis point spread of Wachovia is far less than the term spread seen in the LIBOR market on the same date.
For comparative static results, looking at the simpler case of zero coupon bonds is instructive.
Zeroes provide some clear results for how c hanges in the risk process s(t) a ect yield spreads. As the underlying process parameters 1 2 , a n d 3 change, the risk spread, and how that spread spread depends on maturity, also changes. Figures 3a-3c plot spread against maturity for values that encompass the range of parameter values we nd in the data. Figure 3a plots the e ect of maturity on spread for di erent l e v els of 1 , the mean reversion parameter. This has a noticeable, but expected, e ect. For high levels of 1 , the yield spread becomes upward sloping. Conversely, low levels of 1 imply fast mean reversion|so the bank is expected to beless risky in future, and the spread declines with maturity. With a high 1 , mean revision is slow, and today's high probability of loss compounds over time, increasing the spread with maturity. Figure 3b , with results for di erent values of 2 , shows a similar picture. A higher 2 increases both the mean and variance of the process, and for high enough values this leads to an increasing yield spread. Figure 3c shows the e ects of di erent values of 3 . Here the qualitative e ects are less noticeable: in all cases the spread has a \u" shape. The most important impact of 3 is on the correlation of the spread with the risk-free interest rate, which w e discuss in more detail below.
A revealing chart plots the sensitivity of the yield spread to changes in the instantaneous spread s(0). (This is just the derivative of 12). Figure 4 shows this as a function of maturity. Roughly, this chart shows how m uch of an increase in the instantaneous failure rate s(0), shows up in the subdebt spread. The result depends heavily on maturity: less than 10 percent o f t h e increase shows up in a 10 year bond. Di erences in 1 matter as well, particularly for shorter maturities|the e ect is generally washed out for longer. Thus, maturity has a big impact on a bond's ability to signal a particular type of risk change, though, as we discuss in section 6, this is not always the only, or the most relevant, risk to consider. Zeroes make up a very small proportion of the subordinated debt market (Sironi (2001) nds only 1.6 percent of European bank Subdebt issues are zeroes). Most are coupon bonds of varying maturities. Figure 5 shows the par credit spreads for the risky bonds. They also have a slight downward slope. Unlike the zero coupon spread curves, these par spreads do depend on the term structure. Since the term structure at the time was upward sloping, the par credit spreads are all slightly higher, though with no noticeable change in slope. Figure 6 shows how the shape of the riskless yield curve a ects par credit spreads. It shows the par credit spread for a hypothetical ve y ear par coupon subordinated debt issue, based on the parameter estimates for Chase. The risk free yields make their presence felt: the long end of the credit spread slopes up or down depending on the slope of the initial term structure. A careful look at the scale, however, reveals that the di erence is on the order of two basis points. The credit spread is insensitive to the risk-free term structure, by these calculations.
The e ect of a shock to the state variable, s(t), on the par spread depends on the maturity of the bond, on 1 , on the size of the shock to the short credit spread, and on the shape of the riskless yield curve. The size of the shock is magni ed by 2 and its distance from 3 , and its correlation with the riskless interest rate also depends on 3 . In terms of the parameters observed, however, changes in the state variable s(t) do not have a large impact on the credit spread. Figure 7 shows the changes in credit spread as s (0) varies, given the parameters for the ve banks in our sample, assuming a maturity o f v e y ears. The e ects are mostly on the order of less than one basis point.
Any conclusion about the proper design of subdebt cannot bemade without a comparison to other proposals, but these results do bear on the question of subdebt maturity. The answer, however, depends on the purpose of the debt. If regulators desire only a rough ranking of banks by risk, perhaps to con rm or deny examination ratings, maturity does not matter. It is unlikely that the regulator would misclassify banks by ignoring maturity. If one desires a more active monitoring that detects changes in a bank's risk, then maturity does matter and shorter is better. The subdebt spread becomes highly sensitive only for maturities shorter than two y ears. Furthermore, these signals are robust to noise in the sense of varying little with the shape of the risk-free yield curve.
Spreads for Floating Rate Debt
Floating rate subordinated debt pays out a xed spread above a oating benchmark, which w e take as LIBOR. The certainty e q u i v alents of the LIBOR cash ows can be determined, and the spread can then be determined such that the bond is issued at par. The change in this par spread over time is the signal that we n o w i n vestigate. Du e and Liu (2001) study the term structure of yield spreads between oating rate and otherwise identical xed rate bonds. The credit spreads of the two need not bethe same. For example, if the term structure slopes upward, investors expect that oating rate coupons will increase over time. Default risk, however, also increases over time. As the later and higher coupons are also the most likely to be lost to default, investors who hold the oating rate bond must be compensated by a oating point spread that is slightly larger.
For our ve banks, the di erence between par spreads on xed and oating bonds is small for all maturities, averaging one-third of a basis point. This con rms the Du e and Liu result that the magnitude of the di erences is small. Since credit spreads based on oating rate bonds are so similar to those based on xed rates, the signaling mechanisms of the two are similar and the implications in the previous section follow through.
Spreads for Putable Fixed Coupon Bonds
We n o w consider the proposal that calls for banks issuing American style putable xed coupon bonds, where the coupon is set so the bondis initially priced at par. If the performance of the put is guaranteed regardless of the condition of the bank, then the putable bond provides a money-back guarantee. This assumption is unreasonable since the conditions under which the put might be optimally exercised include states of nature where the credit condition of the bank has deteriorated, and in these states of nature, the rm may not be able to deliver on its obligations. In light of this, we assume that if the bond defaults before the option is exercised, the option is made worthless. That is, the put option is an American put option which is knocked out if the bank defaults.
Notice that if the put option was a European option, its value would not depend on the recovery rate at all. Payouts at the expiry date would only beobtained if no default occurred over the entire period. In contrast, for the American knockout, the decision to put the bond or not is based on the current market price of the defaultable bond, and that value is in uenced by the recovery value of the bond.
To price this contract, we s i m ulate the hazard rate and the short interest rate dynamics, and based on the hazard rate establish whether a default occurs in a particular period. If a default occurs, then the option is worthless, and a payout of $0 is assigned to the path thereafter. If no default occurs, we compute the risky bond price based on the state variables and the intrinsic value of the put option. We then use these values in the Longsta /Schwartz simulation model. 8 Of course, the putable bond may be exercised because interest rates have increased. Hence, the put feature does not provide a claim that precisely targets credit risk, and as a result the option adjusted spread for this instrument will clearly be a ected by the riskless yield curve. In this regard, the correlation e ects between the credit spread and interest rates become important.
Because the putable bond may be exercised because of changes in the risk free rate, maturity becomes a larger factor in the spread, as a longer maturity gives more time for interest rates to move enough to make the option exercisable. Figure 8 shows the credit spread for the di erent banks in our sample. Maturity di erences are often greater than 10 basis points, and in one case, greater than 20 basis points. It now becomes possible to misclassify banks if maturity is ignored.
The serious concern about putable coupon bonds is that they will beexercised when the risk-free rate falls, not only when the credit spread rises. The initial term structure becomes important because it in uences the direction rates will move and thus the probability t h a t the put will be exercised. In our case, however, the actual e ect is quite small: the change is a few basis points at most. The problem shows up much more when the e ect of the change in interest rate volatility is plotted, as in gure 9. Particularly for the longer maturities, the e ect of increasing interest rate volatility is easily more than 50 basis points. The added volatility makes the put more valuable, and thus the observed credit spread decreases. While the volatility has no direct e ect on the pure credit spread, to the extent that credit shocks are correlated with interest rate shocks, the higher volatility makes the bank debt riskier. The put not only adds noise both to the exercise of the option and to the value of the spread, it also directly masks the risk signal: the spread decreases as the bank gets riskier.
Spreads for Putable Floating Rate Bonds
The nal proposal that we consider argues for the creation of putable oating rate bonds. As in the previous case, we assume that the put contracts are made worthless if they are not exercised prior to default. The advantage of using a oating rate bond is that at reset dates, the discount from par is fully attributed to credit risk. If credit risk has remained the same, then the price of the bondat reset dates fully re ects credit risk, not interest rate risk, and the decision by bondholders to exercise the put will be based on credit events alone. Figure 10 plots the credit spreads for putable oating rate bonds.
Attaching the put option to a oating-rate bondremoves the in uence of the initial term structure and of maturity on the credit spread. There is also no longer much of an e ect from changes in interest rate volatility. Making the bond oating accomplishes the objective o f removing the in uence of riskfree interest rates on the put.
The possibility still remains, though, that the put may drive the credit spread in perverse directions if the credit spread process changes. The e ects, however, are quite negligible. Figures  11a, 11b , and 11c isolate put's e ect on the spread from changes in 1 , 2 , and 3 . These never even reach one-half of a basis point. In part, this is because for our sample, the put was out of the money, and not worth much. Had it beenmore valuable, the e ects would have been larger|but our calibration does establish that for a representative time, the put has little e ect on the spread. One further consequence is that the sensitivity of the spread to changes in the state variable (instantaneous spread) is little a ected by the put, as demonstrated by gure 12.
Comparing the Proposals
In order for subordinated debt to increase market discipline, it must provide the correct signals to supervisors. An important criterion for evaluating di erent proposals must beinformation content|how hard will it beto extract the correct information about bank risk from subordinated debt? One straightforward signal is the credit spread|the spread between yields on subordinated debt and comparable risk-free rates (in our paper, LIBOR).
Looking at the spread is the standard approach, but not the only one. Some studies have used option valuation techniques to back out a risk measure from subordinated debt prices (Gorton and Santomero (1990) , Schellhorn and Spellman (1996) ), and often emphasize the nonlinear relation between risk and credit spread, as higher risk may correspond to either larger or smaller spreads (Bliss (2000) also stresses this). Though our approach is in some ways complementary to this branch of the literature in that we work directly with an asset pricing model, we concentrate on spreads rather than on implied volatilities for several reasons. First, the negative relation between risk and credit spread, though theoretically possible, has not been observed in subordinated debt prices. Furthermore, such models, based on the fundamental approach to pricing risky debt, are notoriously unreliable at pricing credit spreads, and this calls into question their mapping between risk and prices. Separate from the academic aspects of the problem, it is our view that proposals using spreads are more likely to be adopted by regulators, either because the proposals speci cally mandate spreads (as in Calomiris), or because the regulators would be reluctant to commit to a speci c model for backing out implied risk, perhaps because it would be less veri able than a publicly observable credit spread.
From the perspective of information contained in the credit spread, there is reason to be optimistic about standard, xed coupon subordinated debt. Credit spreads de nitely vary between banks|in some cases by o ver 50 basis points in our small sample. Furthermore, some of the more obvious sources of noise do not seem important. Neither changes in maturity or in the risk-free term structure a ect credit spreads substantially. Nor do shifts in the volatility o f interest rates matter much for the credit spread. As far as one can generalize from our limited sample, while supervisors should be aware of the slope of the yield curve and the bond's maturity, those factors are unlikely to a ect the risk ranking among banks. The credit spread re ects risk, not today's yield curve.
The downside is that credit spreads are not very sensitive to changes in the instantaneous credit spread. We argue below that this is not a disadvantage, but it does point out that sub debt is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of high frequency variation in bank quality.
Floating rate subordinated debt behaves almost identically to xed coupon debt. To the extent that some banks seem to prefer oating rate subdebt (Sironi (2001) nds 25 percent of bank sub debt in Europe is oating), the regulatory burden might bedecreased if banks are allowe d a c hoice between xed and oating debt. Most proposals specify xed coupon debt, but there seems to be no good reason for this.
Making debt putable has been a controversial suggestion. A particular concern is the possibility that xed coupon debt is put for reasons other than credit events. We don't directly address this problem, but our results suggest that this is a serious problem. Maturity has more of an impact, and it becomes harder to rank banks. Even less encouraging for proponents, interest rate volatility matters greatly, e v en when the put is out of the money. Thus, a xed coupon bond with a put attached fails in providing both direct and indirect discipline: adding the put means the market will discipline the bank at inappropriate times, and also makes it harder to extract information from the credit spread. The rst of these concerns has beenexpressed for years, but we con rm the quantitative signi cance of the problem.
Making the putable debt oating avoids many problems of xed rate debt, and maturity a n d term structure disappear as in uences on the credit spread. While a potential disadvantage of putable oating debt could lie in its response to the variability of the credit spread, we nd this is not the case. Adding the put to oating debt does not distort the credit spread signal. While our conclusion in part depends on our sample, it at a minimum establishes a base for a range of parameters.
Broader Lessons: Processes, Pricing, and Proposals
One important contribution an asset pricing approach brings to the study of mandatory subordinated debt proposals is so simple and obvious that it is likely to beoverlooked. It focuses on the importance of the stochastic process driving the combined default/recovery probability. The spread on a risky bond depends on several factors. Today's short spread, or instantaneous default probability, measures only one aspect of bank risk. Longer term spreads depend on other things as well. The mean reversion parameter determines how fast a bank will recover from today's problems. The variance of the process determines the chance of future bad shocks.
The correlation with interest rates determines a bank's sensitivity to interest rates, including whether increases or decreases hurt the bank more. It is important to keep these parameters conceptually separate. A bank with little risk of failing in the very near future (low s(0)) may bevery vulnerable to higher interest rates in the future.
A possible downside to subordinated debt becameapparent in our simulations. The credit spread was also relatively insensitive to several variables that should have mattered more, such as s(0), the instantaneous credit spread (compounding default probability and recovery rate).
The lesson is that the probability of failure between now and the end of the day is not the only, nor even the dominant, factor in pricing a risky bond. Rather, the entire process matters, since it is the expected future evolution of s( 0 ) t h a t g o verns the default probability o ver the next ten years. A case in point i s W achovia|despite a r e l a t i v ely high instantaneous default probability, it has the lowest credit spread, primarily because the shock reverts quickly (low 1 ) to a low mean (low 0 ). Bankers Trust has a high spread because it reverts quickly to a high mean (high 1 with high 0 ). This has important implications for interpreting credit spreads. The bonds, having payo s stretching over several years, provide information about default probabilities over several years| they provide average, rather than point-in-time data. For most purposes that is preferable|we want to know if the bank is going to be around next year, and are less interested in the precise odds that it won't be around tomorrow. The probability of failure over time|and the consequent credit spread|depends on the stochastic process for s(t), not merely its current v alue. That means the mean reversion parameter relative merits of mandatory subordinated debt proposals. Beyond the speci c results, though, we h a ve set up a framework that can capture, or at least raise the issue, of the trade-o s inherent in designing these instruments. Any attempt to balance the competing objectives needs to assess, and preferably assess quantitatively, the e ects of the contract provisions. Only by matching security design with the desired objectives will a useful subordinated debt program emerge.
For T = t, w e h a ve r(t) = f(0 t ) + h(t ; 1 t ) + b 1 1 (t) + b 2 2 (t) + c 2 3 (t):
Further, we also have r(t + 1 ) = f(0 t + 1 ) + h(t t + 1 ) + b 1 1 (t + 1 ) + b 2 2 (t + 1 ) + c 2 3 (t + 1 ) :
Notice 1 (t + 1 ) = a 1 1 (t) + a 1 p tZ
(1) t+1 2 (t + 1 ) = a 1 2 (t) + a 1 p tZ (2) t+1 3 (t + 1 ) = a 2 3 (t) + a 2 p tZ (2) t+1 :
Substituting these terms into the equation (20) we obtain r(t + 1 ) = f(0 t + 1 ) + h(t t + 1 ) + a 1 (r(t) ; f(0 t ) ; h(t ; 1 t )) +(a 2 ; a 1 )c 2 3 (t) + b 1 a 1 p tZ (1) t+1 + b 2 a 1 p tZ (2) t+1 + c 2 a 2 p tZ (2) t+1 : (21) Let`(t) = h(t ; 1 t ). The exact expression for`(t) can be obtained by substituting in equations (16) and (17) 
The dynamics of the variables r(t) and u(t) then follow b y transforming the state variable 3 (t), to u(t) using 3 (t) = u(t).
These two state variables also determine the term structure. Reconsider the forward rate equation, it can be written as: f(t T) = f(0 T ) + h(t ; 1 T ) + a T;t 1 (b 1 1 (t) + b 2 2 (t)) + c 2 a T;t 2 3 (t) = f(0 T ) + h(t ; 1 T ) + a T;t 1 (r(t) ; f(0 t ) ; h(t ; 1 t )) + c 2 (a T;t 2 ; a T;t 1 )ku(t): This completes the proof of the rst part of Proposition 1. Now consider the second part of the Proposition. The riskless discount bond price at time t can be obtained by induction. For n = 1 the bond price equation leads to P(t t + 1 ) = e ;r(t) t which is the correct result. Now assume that: P(t t + n) = e ;An(t);Bnr(t) t;Cnu(t) t :
Then, P(t t + n + 1 ) = e ;r(t) t E P(t + 1 t + n + 1 ) ] = e ;r(t) t E e ;An(t+1);Bn r(t+1) t;Cnu(t+1) t ]:
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After computing the expectation, we obtain the result.
Proof of Proposition 2
The results can be obtained by induction. When n = 1 , G(t t + 1 ) = e ;r(t) t;s(t) t , which is correct. Assume G(t t + n) = e ; An(t); Bnr(t) t; Cnu(t) t; Dns(t) t . Then, G(t t + n + 1 ) = e ;r(t) t;s(t) t E G Table 1 shows the percentage errors in swaption prices for September 30, 1999. The optimization procedure is described in the text. The volatility structure of forward rates was estimated using data on the LIBOR term structure and concurrent swaption prices as discussed in the text. The estimated parameters are κ 1 =0.044978; κ 2 =3.407608; b 1 =0.00014383; b 2 =-0.012441; c 2 =0.018797.
The credit spreads for the five banks at maturities from 1 to 5 years are based on the model described in the text and the parameters in table 3. S(0) change in the instantaneous spread. The change in credit spread given a unit change in s(0), for maturities ranging from 6 months to 10 years. The same values are used for α1 as in figure 3 .
The credit spread for coupon bonds at par of maturities from 1 to 9 years, based on the parameters in table 3. The credit spread is plotted against maturity for the Chase Manhattan parameters of table 3, varying the shape of the underlying risk-free term structure. Actual denotes the actual term structure for September 30, 1999. Flat denotes a constant 5% term structure. The downward sloping yield curve is given by (5 -0.4k)% for maturity k, and the upward sloping by (5 + 0.4k)%.
The change in the credit spread for a coupon bond at par, with a maturity of 5 years, calculated for different banks using the parameters given in table 3. The coupon is set so that the bond is initially priced at par, given the American put, which is knocked out if the bank defaults before the bond matures. The bond is puttable at par. The option is priced using the Longstaff/Schwartz simulation method described in the text.
Using Chase Manhattan parameters from table 3, the volatility of the risk-free interest rate varies from 0.026358 to 0.106358. The initial coupon is set so that the bond is initially priced at par, given the American put, which is knocked out if the bank defaults before the bond matures. The bond is puttable at par. The option is priced using the Longstaff/Schwartz simulation method described in the text. The change in credit spread given a unit change in s(0), for maturities ranging from 2 years to 9 years. The same values are used for α1 as in figure 3. 
